Special guest post by Marvin Hamor Bernardo and Jason Wang

China’s global disinformation strategy is evolving. During two separate incidents on August 19 and 31, Chinese and Philippine vessels collided in and around Sabina Shoal. Within about 4 hours, PRC disinformation was widely published including on-ship video via social media. 

By being first to publish their disinformation narrative, China seeks to seize the initiative to frame itself as the victim in the court of public opinion. This is a direct challenge to the Philippines’ transparency initiative. 

What was also notable about the first incident was that the Philippine Coast Guard vessels involved were "AIS-dark". They did not have their automatic identification system (AIS) broadcasts switched on. To some degree this tactic is understandable, as China's recent aggression has unfortunately put a premium on covert operations--even for coast guard ships operating in their own waters!

However, there is also a downside. By squelching its broadcasts even when its ships are already in close contact with China's, the Philippine government cedes back some of the information advantage that transparency brings, and gives Beijing additional room to push out its narrative. 

The Tale of Two Incidents at Sabina Shoal

Mere hours after each incident, Chinese news and social media accused Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) vessels of deliberately colliding with China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels. 

In the case of the August 19 incident, CCG 21551 impeded the lawful passage of BRP Bagacay (MRRV-4410) and subsequently collided with the vessel. This is supported by images released by the PCG showing hull damage to the Bagacay.  On the 31st of August, the CCG was even more aggressive, repeatedly ramming BRP Teresa Magbanua while it was underway inside Sabina Shoal, resulting in a gaping hole in the hull. Both of these incidents happened within the 200 nautical mile Philippine exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

While CCG blocking maneuvers and mischaracterizations of events are nothing new, it is now being supported by a robust PRC disinformation effort, with videos captured from multiple filming angles widely distributed in near real time to Chinese social media. This indicates significant pre-planning, with multiple Chinese vessels prepared to capture and reframe the action to fit Beijing's narrative of Philippine provocations eliciting justified "law enforcement" actions by China.

So what? Unlike other recent incidents, no recorded AIS data points were available from the Philippine vessels on 16 August. As a constant target of China’s gray zone warfare, this poses a graver problem for the Philippines when combating China’s counter narrative. We believe Chinese disinformation operations are evolving and speeding up.  Allowing China to take the initiative in disinformation operations would be a mistake.  

Pretext to Escalate 

The PRC has characterized the August 19 incident as a violation of the July 21st interim arrangement to de-escalate tensions regarding the resupply missions to the Second Thomas Shoal.  Unfortunately, in the weeks following, PRC maritime militia and coast guard vessels aggressively contested Philippine presence in Sabina Shoal. Following the August 31 ramming incident, tug boats were first sighted inside Sabina Shoal, indicating Chinese intent to forcibly remove Philippine vessels from the area. 

Taken as a wider trend, these repeated clashes serve as a pretext to escalate to enable further encroachment on the Philippines' EEZ. China seeks to normalize their aggressive behavior. Should Beijing cancel the interim arrangement it could then blame the Philippines, citing these incidents as having forced their hand. This would set the conditions for exploiting the advantage as China pushes deeper into Philippine waters.

Tracking Maritime Activity

AIS has been crucial in helping independent observers to quickly and accurately evaluate characterize CCG and maritime militia aggressions in the South China Sea. Previous incidents, such as the rotation and resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre on Second Thomas Shoal were greeted by an armada of CCG and several militia ships each time. AIS identifies the number of vessels involved and their tracks. More importantly, AIS assists in understanding how the CCG conducts area denial activities against Philippine ships. 

There have been multiple instances of direct CCG action against the Philippines in the West Philippine Sea just in 2024. On March 6-7 at Scarborough Shoal, BRP Malabrigo was blocked by two CCG ships supported by two Chinese maritime militia. Throughout the 7th, multiple attempts to approach the shoal were made but all failed. By tracking the vessels’ interaction, we can see how aggressively the CCG blocked the BRP Malabrigo. During this entire exchange, there were at least eight maritime militia vessels loitering within the lagoon. 

On a March 23 resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal, BRP Cabra was encircled by CCG and maritime militia vessels. According to reports, BRP Cabra was isolated from the convoy by the Chinese maritime forces. Published videos and AIS data support the Philippine position. 

Using historical AIS data from 2023, the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative found that the CCG patrolled the Scarborough Shoal for 311 days and 302 days for Second Thomas Shoal, which is more than 80 percent of the year. The actual number is probably much higher given the CCG's frequent habit of turning off its own AIS broadcasts ("going dark"). Their observation of the 5 features most frequented by Chinese patrols in the SCS saw an average of 275 days of patrol. AIS data shows how the Philippines is overmatched by the PRC maritime assets. 

These area denial activities are used by Beijing to assert its excessive and extralegal claims of jurisdiction, as well as to prevent certain activity by other claimant states. AIS tracking enables governments and independent, third party analysts to identify Chinese maritime forces’ intrusive and reckless behavior, and their blatant disregard for the International Maritime Organization's 1972 Convention on the International Regulation for Preventing Collision at Sea (COLREGS).

Wider Regional Aggression

China’s aggressive behavior is not isolated to just the Philippines. Taiwan and Japan have also recently experienced elevated levels of coercive, aggressive and deceptive behavior by the CCG. The February 2024 capsizing incident leading to the death of two fishermen illegally fishing off the coast of Taiwan’s Kinmen island was used to justify increased Chinese presence around the island. CCG vessels now routinely enter the restricted waters south of Kinmen Island and harass Taiwanese fishermen in the Taiwan Strait. 

Notably, since February 2024, over a half dozen PRC fishermen have mysteriously died off the coast of China. Taiwan has responded in good faith to support search and rescue efforts each time, but these good samaritan efforts have not been returned in kind by China. 

More recently, three Chinese Coast Guard vessels entered the 12-mile territorial limit around the Senkaku Islands, harassing Japanese fishing boats. The CCG has conducted regular intrusive patrols against its other South China Sea neighbors Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam as well.

Conclusion

To justify its aggression, China is altering the facts on the ground (er ... water) while attributing blame for its actions to the other claimant states.  Since early 2023, free passage to more locations have been blocked by China using tactics like laser dazzlers, vessel swarms and water cannons. Now China has even normalized ramming. Worryingly, the growing frequency of CCG attacks on Philippine naval vessels is accompanied by a coordinated media blitz that immediately disseminates its narrative through traditional and social media. To ensure the success and integrity of the transparency initiative, the Philippines needs to continue transmitting their AIS data in order for independent assessment of the incidents, strengthening the Philippine position.

On a wider scale, Manila's neighbors should recognize that even as Beijing is testing and refining its gray zone tactics against the Philippines, it will surely be applying them elsewhere even more robustly in the future. China continues to evolve and improve its disinformation and coercive tactics, and transparency is a key tool in any country's counter-gray zone toolkit. 

Marvin Hamor Bernardo is a doctoral candidate at the International Doctoral Program in Asia-Pacific Studies at the National Chengchi University, Taiwan. 

Jason Wang is the COO and national security researcher at ingeniSPACE, a geospatial analytics house.