The Evolution of the Militia

China's maritime militia, sometimes referred to as its “little blue men,” has been active in the South China Sea since at least 1974 and the seizure of the western Paracel Islands from South Vietnam, just as the government in Saigon was nearing its end. For years, militia operations were primarily based at Hainan Island, a region that, according to Chinese law, has jurisdiction over the South China Sea. This area has maintained a trained and active militia, particularly around disputed locations such as the Scarborough Shoal.

However, things have taken a sharp turn over the last decade. In 2012, China took control of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines. Shortly afterwards, Xi Jinping rose to power and began efforts to professionalize and expand the maritime militia.

As superbly laid out in the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative's comprehensive 2021 study, China's maritime militia is divided into two main groups—though some vessels do not fit neatly into either category. These include the professional militia fleet, known as MMFVs (maritime militia fishing vessels), and the Spratly Backbone fleet, or SBFVs (Spratly backbone fishing vessels).

The Dual Role of China's Maritime Militia

The MMFVs comprise a professional militia stationed primarily in Hainan Province. Although they appear to be civilian fishing vessels, their actual fishing operations are essentially non-existent. Instead, their primary functions are paramilitary: gathering intelligence, conducting surveillance and engaging in direct aggressions against vessels deemed hostile under the instructions of the People's Liberation Army.

Reportedly equipped with high-pressure water cannons and light weapons these vessels act as frontline enforcers of China’s maritime claims and work in close coordination with the China Coast Guard, though their reinforced hulls are the weapons they use most often, with tactics such as blocking, swarming and ramming.

Unlike the MMFVs, the SBFVs are working commercial fishing vessels that have been specifically built or retrofitted for militia purposes. Their owners and crews are motivated by both nationalistic pride and substantial financial incentives, making militia work a more lucrative option than traditional fishing. Based out of five main ports in Guangdong Province—Zhanjiang, Maoming, Yangjiang, Taishan, and Jiangmen—these vessels are tasked with maintaining a persistent Chinese presence in the Spratly Islands.

Rather than engaging in direct confrontations with foreign navies or law enforcement, the SBFVs mainly serve as a reserve force. They spend over 280 days a year anchored in the Spratly Islands to qualify for government subsidies. During this time, they collect intelligence, fly the Chinese flag, and prevent other nations' vessels from accessing fishing grounds. They also coordinate activities with the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and are expected to assist with military operations if needed.

The dual approach of using MMFVs for direct confrontation and SBFVs for maintaining a prolonged presence normalizes China’s assertive actions and strengthens its ability to enforce its territorial claims in the region.

Rafting

China's strategic use of SBFVs to discreetly flout international law is a significant concern in the realm of gray-zone tactics. A particularly pervasive tactic employed by these vessels is known as "rafting." This technique involves tying multiple vessels together at anchor to create semi-permanent floating outposts, which are challenging to disperse due to their collective mass.

These formations enable China to assert control over specific areas and reinforce its territorial claims by maintaining a continuous and visible presence in contested waters, while also allowing the flexibility to relocate them as needed.

Rafting allows China to avoid overtly militarizing the region, as the intimidating presence of large, connected fleets deters foreign vessels from approaching, reducing the likelihood of direct confrontations and complicating diplomatic responses. The primary advantage of rafting lies in its legal ambiguity. By anchoring--but not fishing--in another country's lawful exclusive economic zone (EEZ), these SBFVs maintain a technically legal (since they are not exploiting maritime resources) and apparently passive presence while building China's case for ownership by means of extended occupation. This strategy not only secures resources for China but also advances its geopolitical ambitions while evading direct consequences.

Whitsun Reef Incident 

Between March and June 2021, over 200 Chinese marine vessels rafted together at Whitsun Reef, which lies just within the Philippines' 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Despite China's claims that these vessels were merely seeking shelter from a storm, the persistent presence of rafted ships highlighted their strategic intent. This tactic has through ensuing years allowed China to effectively occupy the reef and deter Philippine and other foreign vessels from entering the area, showcasing China's ability to assert control without direct military engagement.

Unmasking China’s Maritime Militia

To identify the Chinese Maritime Militia vessels and distinguish them from regular fishing vessels, experts use two primary indicators and four supporting indicators.

Primary Indicators

Keywords 

Any vessel identified by names that include terms like “militia,” “maritime militia,” or “distant-water maritime militia” is considered a potential militia vessel. This direct identification is generally limited to experts able to research Chinese-language sources, as official messaging almost never identifies specific ships as militia. Beijing prefers their status remain ambiguous.

However, experts have noted that all observed vessels from the Qiong Sansha Yu fleet appear to engage in active paramilitary activities associated with MMFVs. Other fleets involved in militia work include Qiong Lin Yu and Yue Tai Yu. (For other fleets consult AMTI's comprehensive report.)

Vessel Behavior

These vessels are often observed loitering near disputed features like Thitu Island, Sabina Shoal, Iroquois Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Whitsun Reef without engaging in fishing activities--either through photographs or Automatic Identification System (AIS) data. This clearly non-commercial activity identifies them as probable militia. 

Of course, any active involvement in known maritime gray zone activities is strongly indicative.

Secondary Indicators

Connections to Known Militia Vessels, Officers, Companies or Activities

If a fishing vessel is frequently seen alongside or near recognized militia vessels in port or at sea, it can be an indicator of militia affiliation. Additionally, if a vessel is photographed or reported in the same locations as Chinese military, coast guard or fishery law enforcement vessels--and it engages in non-fishing activities such as maritime rescue drills--it is likely affiliated with the militia.

Government Subsidies

Receiving significantly higher government subsidies, particularly for fuel, can indicate that a vessel is part of China’s maritime militia. Although regular fishing vessels also receive subsidies, those receiving the highest amounts—at least CNY 6,769,000 (approximately USD 1 million) annually—are likely militia vessels.

Anomalous Features of Fishing Vessels

Fishing vessels that are abnormally large, understaffed, equipped with unusual specifications, or operating in designated strategic waters are likely part of China’s maritime militia.

Government Ownership Connections

Fishing vessels with ownership ties to the Chinese government may be part of the maritime militia. However, this is not always the case, as some identified militia vessels do not have these links.

Subsidies: The Militia Enabler

China's maritime militia operates with a significant boost from various government subsidies, leveraging its civilian fleet to assert dominance and control in contested maritime regions.

Double Fuel Subsidies

One of the most impactful subsidies is the double fuel subsidy for fishing vessels operating in the Spratly Islands. These vessels receive two types of fuel subsidies: a regular subsidy that lowers the standard fuel price and an additional special subsidy specifically for operating in the Spratly Islands. Large fishing vessels--over 55 meters in length and with engines greater than 1,200 kW--can claim up to CNY 24,175 (about USD 3,750) per day in fuel subsidies. There's also an annual bonus for vessels deployed into the Spratly archipelago or Scarborough Shoal, which has historically been around CNY 35,000 (USD 5,420). 

Construction Subsidies

The government also heavily supports the construction and renovation of SBFVs. These enable the transformation of regular fishing boats into maritime militia vessels. The conversion process is meticulously overseen by military stakeholders to ensure that the vessels meet specific operational requirements.

Direct Subsidies

Provincial and local governments may also chip in with direct subsidies, often matching a percentage of the central government subsidies. These payments help offset the construction and operational costs for fishing vessels involved in militia activities, making it financially viable for owners and crews to participate in these missions.

Loan-Interest Subsidies

To further support the renovation of SBFVs, some local governments may help offset debt interest payments. For instance, Sanya City in Hainan covers 70% of the annual loan interest over five years for these vessels. This kind of financial support encourages further investment in maritime militia capabilities.

Subsidies for the Construction of Professional Maritime Militia Fishing Vessels

Hainan Province invests heavily in constructing and upgrading MMFVs. In 2014, the province received national funding to build high-tonnage vessels for maritime militia units, with subsidies reportedly exceeding CNY 40 million (USD 6.19 million) per vessel. By 2018, it was estimated that Hainan spent around CNY 1.86 billion (USD 288 million) on upgrading 186 vessels. Similarly, Sansha City has also been involved in constructing high-capacity vessels, with costs estimated around CNY 21 million (USD 3.25 million) per vessel.

Subsidies for Equipment

From 2015 to 2019, China’s central government issued special transfer payments to upgrade communication, navigation, and safety equipment on fishing vessels, including ultra-shortwave radios, GPS systems and safety gear. In Guangdong, this equipment has been incorporated into the Fisheries Safety Communication and Command System, enhancing the dual-use capability of vessels for both civilian and military functions.

Subsidies For Militia Operations 

Funding for militia operations includes expenses for military training, equipment maintenance and organizational development, with costs distributed between provincial and local governments. The amount of funding can vary considerably depending on regional needs and priorities.

Subsidies to Maritime Militia Personnel

Training subsidies for part-time militia personnel are determined by local economic conditions. Full-time personnel employed by state-owned fisheries receive their salaries and additional benefits from these enterprises, leading to variations in the support they receive.

Subsidies for the Recruitment of Veterans

A nationwide initiative called the 'Spindrift Program' offers vocational training and job placement for veterans. It prioritizes those with military experience to leverage their skills and discipline, ensuring seamless integration into maritime operations and enhancing maritime militia capabilities.

References

Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. (2022, July 8). Woody Island. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. https://amti.csis.org/woody-island/.

Chen, A. (2024, August 3). How is China’s “maritime militia” supporting the PLA in the South China Sea? South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3272432/south-china-sea-what-beijings-maritime-militia-and-how-does-it-support-pla. 

Lendon, B. (2021, April 13). Beijing has a Navy it doesn’t even admit exists, experts say. and it’s swarming parts of the South China Sea. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/12/china/china-maritime-militia-explainer-intl-hnk-ml-dst/index.html.

Poling, G. B., Prétat, H., Mallory, T. G., & Center for Advanced Defense Studies. (2021, November 18). Pulling back the curtain on China’s maritime militia. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/211118_Poling_Maritime_Militia.pdf?Y5iaJ4NT8eITSlAKTr.TWxtDHuLIq7wR.

Puri, S., & Austin, G. (n.d.). What the Whitsun Reef Incident tells us about China’s Future Operations at Sea. International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/online-analysis/2021/04/whitsun-reef-incident-china/.

Ratcliffe, R. (2024, July 29). South China Sea: A visual guide to the key shoals, reefs and Islands. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/30/south-china-sea-map-visual-guide-key-shoals-reefs-islands.

The Center for Strategic & International Studies. (2019, October 1). The Critical Role of Chinese Trade in the South China Sea. JSTOR. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep22586.30?seq=2.